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Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the University
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Waiver by Litigation Conduct Doctrine
Jason Kornmehl*

Abstract
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is one of the most confusing areas of constitutional law. The waiver by litigation conduct doctrine represents a particularly complex aspect of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Courts, for example, have not precisely defined the extent to which waiver in
a prior proceeding might extend to a future one. The Patent Trial and Appeals
Board recently considered this issue in a novel context. In Ericsson, Inc. v.
Regents of the University of Minnesota, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board
applied the waiver by litigation conduct doctrine in an inter partes review
proceeding. Combining the Eleventh Amendment, non-Article III courts, and
patent law, Ericsson qualifies as an important ruling. This article explores
the Ericsson decision and its implications.

*
Jason Kornmehl is an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. The views expressed are his
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As part of its sweeping reform of the patent system in the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA), Congress created a new proceeding called inter
partes review that enables third parties to challenge the validity of patent
claims before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB or the “Board”).1 As “the most significant patent reform legislation since the original [Patent Act] of 1790,”2 the AIA and its newly created
inter partes review procedure have unsurprisingly generated substantial
scholarly and judicial debate.3 In fact, the inter partes framework has already
been subject to U.S. Supreme Court review,4 and the Court has recently held
that this administrative proceeding does not violate Article III of the U.S. Constitution or the Seventh Amendment.5
The inter partes review process has also spawned considerable litigation
and public policy concerns over the use of sovereign immunity to thwart invalidity challenges. For example, in the wake of Allergan’s highly publicized
assignment of a top-selling drug to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe,6 a federal
district court expressed “serious doubts” whether the company could shield
these patents from inter partes review,7 and a congressional subcommittee
1.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012).
2.
Joseph W. Dubis, Inter Partes Review: A Multi-Method Comparison for Challenging Patent Validity, 6 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 109 (2015).
3.
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding: Evaluating Post-Grant
Review, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 335 (2016) (“A great and growing body of empirical research
is now emerging on the uses (and potential abuses) of inter partes review . . . . Legal challenges have
also been mounted against the very framework in which the [AIA]’s patent validity review mechanisms operate . . . .”).
4.
E.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–46 (2016) (analyzing the
extent to which courts can review inter partes institution decisions and the proper standard for claim
construction in inter partes review).
5.
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370
(2018). In a case decided on the same day as Oil States, the Court held that once the PTAB grants
review of an inter partes review petition, it is statutorily required to address every contested claim
raised in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018) (analyzing 35 U.S.C.
§ 318(a) and concluding the PTAB “must address every claim the petitioner has challenged”).
6.
Jonathon D. Rockoff, Allergan Partners with Indian Tribe to Protect Drug Patents, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2017, 4:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/allergan-partners-with-indian-tribe-toprotect-drug-patents-1504892222; Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native
American Tribe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/health/allerganpatent-tribe.html.
7.
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at
*3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation).
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held a hearing to examine the interplay between sovereign immunity and patent law.8 In its most recent exposition on the applicability of sovereign immunity to inter partes review, the PTAB held in Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.
v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe that the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe could not
assert tribal immunity as a defense to inter partes review,9 a decision which
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed on appeal in July
2018.10
In addition to tribal sovereign immunity, the PTAB has opined on state
sovereign immunity in inter partes review.11 In contrast to its decision in
Mylan, the PTAB has held that state sovereign immunity is available as a defense to inter partes review.12 In December 2017, the PTAB made a foray
into the waiver of state sovereign immunity issue.13 In Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, the PTAB ruled that by filing an infringement suit, a state university effected a waiver of state sovereign immunity against inter partes review of the disputed patent.14 Because parties may
at some point need to enforce their intellectual property rights through litigation, the panel’s decision in Ericsson severely undermines the potential stratagem of transferring or licensing patents to state entities to avoid the inter
partes review process.15 The PTAB’s decision in Ericsson is also significant
for its application of the doctrine of waiver by litigation conduct—a complex
and unsettled area of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence—in a novel
8.
Sovereign Immunity and the Intellectual Property System: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017)
(examining the issue of intellectual property rights owned by entities that claim sovereign immunity
on the basis of the 11th Amendment or Native American tribal immunity).
9.
No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
10. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 2018-1638, 2018 WL 3484448, at
*4 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2018).
11. See Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL
6517563, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
12. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. Although it recognized the “many parallels”
between state and tribal sovereign immunity in upholding the PTAB’s decision in Mylan, the Federal
Circuit declined to weigh in on the issue of whether state sovereign immunity is a viable defense to
inter partes review. See Mylan, 2018 WL 3484448, at *4 (“[W]e leave for another day the question
of whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity differently [from tribal sovereign
immunity].”).
13. See Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2.
14. Id. at *4. The Board issued a similar ruling in a companion case decided the same day as
Ericsson. See LSI Corp. & Avago Techs U.S., Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., IPR2017-01068
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
15. See infra Part V.
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setting.16
This article analyzes the PTAB’s ruling in Ericsson and the potential ramifications of the Board’s decision. Part II of this Article describes the inter
partes review process. Part III provides a brief overview of the Eleventh
Amendment, its application in the context of inter partes review, and the
waiver by litigation conduct doctrine. Next, Part IV summarizes the PTAB’s
decision in Ericsson. Part V examines the PTAB’s waiver analysis and asserts
that the Board may have erred in finding a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Finally, Part VI concludes the discussion.
II. INTER PARTES REVIEW
Prior to the passage of the AIA, the only administrative mechanisms for
challenging the validity of a patent post-issuance were ex parte reexamination
and inter partes reexamination.17 The AIA created new procedures for reconsidering the validity of a patent, including replacing inter partes reexamination with inter partes review.18 In inter partes review, a party (usually a competitor or defendant in an infringement action) may file a petition challenging
a patent for lack of novelty or obviousness based on prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications.19 Although inter partes review is similar in
many respects to inter partes reexamination, the fundamental difference between these two processes is that inter partes review is an adjudicative rather
than an examinational procedure.20
In addition to inter partes review, a party may challenge a patent’s

16. Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1.
17. See Andrei Iancu & Ben Haber, Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents Act, 93
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 476, 477 (2011); Stephen N. Kulhanek, Inter Partes Review and
Federal Litigation: Parallel Proceedings and Inconsistent Results, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1093, 1097–
98 (2017).
18. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012); Iancu & Haber, supra note 17, at 478; Michael J. Flibbert & Sarah E. Craven, Appellate Review of the AIA’s New Patent-Challenge Proceedings,
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE MAG. (Mar. 2013), https://www.financierworldwide.com/appellate-reviewof-the-aias-new-patent-challenge-proceedings/#.W1j3LdVKiAZ.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2017).
20. See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The purpose of
this reform was to ‘convert[ ] inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative
proceeding.’” (quoting H.R. REP. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011))).
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validity through litigation in federal district court.21 When a patent holder
files an infringement action, an alleged infringer can raise invalidity of the
patent as a defense.22 Alternatively, in a “mirror image of a suit for patent
infringement,” a putative infringer can seek a declaratory judgment to have
the patent declared invalid.23 In many cases, the infringer will petition the
PTAB for inter partes review of a patent’s validity concurrent with litigation
in federal court.24 Because petitioners have historically fared well in invalidating patent claims in inter partes review,25 defendants will typically seek to
stay an infringement action pending PTAB review.26
The AIA, however, places some temporal limits on instituting inter partes
review.27 The statute provides that a party cannot file a petition for inter
partes review more than one year after being served with a complaint alleging
patent infringement28 and cannot file a petition after bringing a declaratory
judgment action for invalidity.29
III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY AND WAIVER BY LITIGATION
CONDUCT
“[B]ear[ing] directly on federalism, separation of powers, and the protection of fundamental rights,” the Eleventh Amendment occupies a unique place

21. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012); see Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 92 (2013).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 282(b); see Ford, supra note 21, at 78.
23. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
24. See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 94 (2014) (showing inter partes review proceedings often have copending district court litigation).
25. See John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J.
1657, 1669 (2016) (“The PTAB’s rates of claim cancellation have cooled with time, but the Board’s
record in winnowing patent claims remains impressive.”); Love & Ambwani, supra note 24, at 94,
105 (conducting “empirical study tracking the outcome of [inter partes reviews] and their impact on
co-pending litigation” and concluding that inter partes review “appears to be a powerful shield for
those accused of patent infringement”); see also Ashby Jones, A New Weapon in Corporate Patent
Wars, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-new-weapon-in-corporate-patent-wars-1394493897 (quoting former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader’s description of the PTAB as “death squads . . . killing property rights”).
26. See Kulhanek, supra note 17, at 1108; Love & Ambwani, supra note 24, at 103.
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1).
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in American constitutional law.30 It provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”31
Over the last one hundred years, the Supreme Court has expansively interpreted this constitutional provision. Despite its text, which appears only to
protect states from lawsuits brought by citizens of another state, the Court has
construed the Eleventh Amendment to protect states from being sued by their
own citizens,32 foreign nations,33 and Indian tribes.34 Additionally, although
the Eleventh Amendment addresses “any suit in law or equity,”35 the Court
has held that it bars suits in admiralty against the states.36 Moreover, notwithstanding the Amendment’s limitation on the “Judicial power of the United
States,”37 the Court has extended immunity to claims brought in state courts.38
Likewise, in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, the Court concluded that states are immune from private actions
brought before a federal administrative agency.39
Constitutional immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment, however,
is not absolute. It is well established that a state may waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity based on its litigation conduct.40 The Court has explained that “where a state voluntarily become[s] a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby, and cannot
30. Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions During the 1988-89 Term, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 322 (1990).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
32. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
33. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
34. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779–80 (1991).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
36. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 503 (1921).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
38. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that “the States retain immunity from
private suit in their own courts”); see Virginia F. Milstead, State Sovereign Immunity and The Plaintiff
State: Does the Eleventh Amendment Bar Removal of Actions Filed in State Court?, 38 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 513, 515–16 (2004) (“[T]he general rule is that a state cannot be sued, whether in state or
federal court, without its consent.”).
39. 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002).
40. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that a state’s “voluntary appearance” in federal court when it intervened as a claimant amounted to a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999) (“We have long recognized that a State’s sovereign immunity is ‘a personal privilege which it
may waive at pleasure.’” (quoting Clark, 108 U.S. at 447)).
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escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the
11th Amendment.”41 Accordingly, the Court has found a waiver of immunity
where a state files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case.42 The Court has also
found that a state’s removal to federal court of state law claims—for which it
had waived immunity to suit in state court—constitutes a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.43 In the intellectual property context, the Federal Circuit has held that a state cannot initiate a patent interference proceeding and
subsequently invoke sovereign immunity to block an appeal to federal court
of the agency’s decision.44 Nonetheless, the parameters of the waiver by litigation conduct doctrine are not clearly defined. For instance, the circuit courts
are divided over whether a state waives sovereign immunity by removing a
case to federal court when it retains immunity in state court.45 The extent to
which a state waives its immunity with respect to counterclaims once it makes
an appearance in federal court is another notable example of the doctrine’s
amorphous boundaries.46
41. Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); accord Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Wisc. Sys. v. Phoenix Int’l Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 459 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] state cannot use
the Eleventh Amendment as a get-out-of-court-free card when it voluntarily submits to a federal tribunal for a judicial determination of its rights.”).
42. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) (“When the State becomes the actor and
files a claim against the fund it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had respecting
the adjudication of the claim.”).
43. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (“We conclude
that the State’s action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
44. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Having
waived any potential immunity as to the interference contest in the [Patent & Trademark Office], we
conclude that the University waived any Constitution-based objection to Vas-Cath’s statutory right of
judicial review.”).
45. Compare Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 488–90 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding no
waiver by removal when a state had not waived immunity from suit on claim in its own courts), with
Phoenix Int’l Software, Inc., 653 F.3d at 461 (observing that a state waives immunity in all instances
in which a state removes a case to federal court). See generally Stroud v. McIntosh, 722 F.3d 1294,
1300 (11th Cir. 2013) (discussing circuit split).
46. Compare In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1148 (4th
Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a state waives its immunity only with respect to compulsory counterclaims
upon filing suit in federal court or a proof of claim in a bankruptcy action), with In re Charter Oak
Assocs., 361 F.3d 760, 769–70 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding a state’s filing of a proof of claim constitutes
a waiver of immunity with respect to permissive counterclaims capped by a setoff limitation). But cf.
New York v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 1:14-CV-747, 2015 WL 12748007, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015)
(“[T]he Court declines to extend the holding in Charter Oak . . . to permit permissive counterclaims
in a CERCLA cost recovery action, even where capped by a setoff limitation.”).
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The PTAB issued a triumvirate of decisions in 2017 dismissing inter
partes review proceedings against state universities on the basis of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.47 The first of these cases, Covidien LP v. University
of Florida Research Foundation Inc., illustrated the uncertain role of the
waiver by litigation conduct doctrine in challenging a patent post-issuance.48
In Covidien, a medical device manufacturer filed three petitions seeking inter
partes review of a patent owned by a state university.49 Relying heavily upon
South Carolina State Ports Authority,50 the PTAB determined that Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies to inter partes review proceedings.51 The panel
emphasized the adversarial nature of inter partes review and observed that the
“rules and procedures governing inter partes review resemble civil litigation
in federal courts.”52 The panel thus concluded that the Eleventh Amendment
bars the institution of inter partes review proceedings against a state that has
not waived immunity.53
The PTAB in Covidien, however, expressly noted that because the university had not brought a patent infringement action in federal court, it did not
need to consider whether such conduct would waive immunity in inter partes
review.54 In December 2017, an expanded PTAB panel in Ericsson opined on
this unsettled issue, thereby clarifying the scope of the waiver by litigation
conduct doctrine in the inter partes review process.55
IV. ERICSSON
Ericsson began when the University of Minnesota (the “University”) sued
47. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274-76, 2017 WL
4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017); NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Balt., No. IPR2016-00208
(P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017); Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914,
2017 WL 2992429 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017).
48. Covidien LP, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11–12.
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id. at *2, 8–11 (citing to Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743 (2002)).
51. Id. at *11 (“On the whole, considering the nature of inter partes review and civil litigation,
we conclude that the considerable resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity
afforded to the States by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
52. Id. at *9.
53. Id. at *12.
54. Id. at *11 n.4.
55. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563,
at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
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AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Cellco Partnership for patent infringement in
2014.56 The University alleged that the four defendants incorporated into their
4G LTE network services, without the University’s consent, patented wireless
communications technology developed by University professors.57 Ericsson,
a telecommunications company that provided equipment to the four named
defendants, successfully intervened in the infringement action in 2016.58
Shortly thereafter, Ericsson filed petitions requesting an inter partes review
of the University’s five patents at issue in the infringement litigation.59 The
court subsequently granted a motion to stay the litigation pending PTAB review of Ericsson’s petitions.60
Recognizing the sovereign immunity barrier erected by Covidien, Ericsson argued in its petitions that the University waived its immunity from inter
partes review when it filed suit for patent infringement.61 Ericsson analogized
inter partes review to a compulsory counterclaim and contended that the University could have anticipated that filing a lawsuit for infringement would lead
to invalidity claims before the PTAB.62 In its motion to dismiss Ericsson’s
petitions, the University took issue with Ericsson’s analogy and countered that
waiver only applies to proceedings in the same forum.63 Ruling in favor of
Ericsson, a unanimous seven-member PTAB panel denied the University’s
motion to dismiss.64
Writing on behalf of the panel, the PTAB’s Chief Administrative Patent
Judge first explained why he had exercised his discretion to expand the tribunal from three to seven administrative patent judges.65 The Chief Judge
56. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 135 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1003 (D. Minn.
2015).
57. Id. at 1004–05.
58. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, No. 14-CV-4666 (JRT/TNL),
2016 WL 7985321, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 3, 2016).
59. Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,774,309 at 1, Ericsson Inc. v. Giannakis, No. IPR2017-01186 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2017).
60. Order Denying Stay, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, No. 0:14cv-04666 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2017).
61. Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss at 1–12, Ericsson Inc. v.
Giannakis, No. IPR2017-01186 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2017).
62. Id.
63. Reply in Support of Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Ericsson Inc. v. Giannakis,
No. IPR2017-01186 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2017).
64. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563,
at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
65. Id.
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identified Eleventh Amendment immunity as an issue that had been raised in
multiple inter partes review matters and noted that the Board had not yet had
the opportunity to address waiver in the context of parallel district court litigation.66 Deeming these issues to be “of an exceptional nature,” the Chief
Judge asserted that an expanded panel was warranted “to ensure uniformity of
the Board’s decisions involving these issues.”67 The panel then endorsed the
reasoning of prior PTAB decisions in finding that sovereign immunity is a
viable defense to inter partes review.68
The panel, however, was quick to elucidate that a state may waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity in inter partes review when it files an infringement action in federal court.69 The PTAB acknowledged the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Biomedical Patent Management Corp. v. California, Department of Health Services that a state’s waiver of immunity in one action
does not usually extend to a separate action.70 Nonetheless, the Board highlighted the appellate court’s observation that there is no “bright-line rule
whereby a [s]tate’s waiver of sovereign immunity can never extend to a . . .
separate lawsuit.”71 In deciding whether the University’s waiver of sovereign
immunity in the federal district court litigation would extend to the inter
partes review, the panel looked to whether the University’s selective invocation of immunity would lead to “unfairness” and “inconsistency.”72
The PTAB first cited Federal Circuit precedent holding that a state waives
immunity as to compulsory counterclaims “because a state as plaintiff can
surely anticipate that a defendant will have to file any compulsory counterclaim or be forever barred from doing so.”73 The panel then credited Ericsson’s contention that inter partes review is akin to a compulsory counterclaim.74 Pointing to the AIA, the panel explained that a defendant in an
infringement action must file a petition for inter partes review within one year

66. Id. at *3.
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *2 (“The Board has previously determined that Eleventh Amendment immunity is
available to States as a defense in an inter partes review proceeding . . . . We agree.”).
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id. (citing Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal., Dep’t of Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
71. Id. (quoting Biomedical Patent, 505 F.3d at 1339).
72. Id. (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002)).
73. Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
74. Id.
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after being served with a complaint or “be forever barred from doing so.”75
The PTAB thus concluded that just as a state can “anticipate that a defendant
will have to file a compulsory counterclaim,” it can also foresee a defendant
in an infringement action having to file a petition for inter partes review.76
Lastly, the panel reasoned that it would be “unfair and inconsistent” to allow
a state to invoke immunity in inter partes review because it is a state’s filing
of an infringement lawsuit that triggers the one-year statute of limitations period.77
V. ERICSSON’S IMPLICATIONS AND THE PTAB’S WAIVER ANALYSIS
Ericsson is an important decision for several reasons. First, Ericsson confirms that state sovereign immunity is available as a defense to inter partes
review.78 Although the PTAB had previously dismissed inter partes review
proceedings on Eleventh Amendment grounds,79 Ericsson involved an expanded seven-member panel comprised of the Chief, Deputy, and Vice Chief
Administrative Patent Judges.80 But what Ericsson confirmed with one hand
it took away with the other. By removing Eleventh Amendment immunity as
a defense to inter partes review after a state entity has filed an infringement
suit in federal court,81 Ericsson impedes companies from shielding patent
claims from PTAB review. Thus, Ericsson, along with the Federal Circuit’s
recent decision in Mylan, is also significant for its likely curtailment of patent
transfer agreements with sovereign entities.
Finally, and most importantly for purposes of this article, the Board’s ruling in Ericsson is significant for its clarification of the contours of the waiver
by litigation conduct doctrine.82 The PTAB, however, appears to have unduly
75. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012)).
76. Id. (quoting Knight, 321 F.3d at 1126).
77. Id.
78. Id. at *2 (citing Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914,
2017 WL 2992429 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017); NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Balt., No. IPR201600208 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017); and Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR201601274, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017)).
79. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
80. Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1 n.2.
81. See id. at *4.
82. See id. at *3 (noting there is no “bright-line rule whereby a State’s waiver of sovereign
immunity can never extend to a . . . separate lawsuit” (quoting Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal.,
Dep’t of Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007))).
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expanded the scope of this doctrine by misapprehending the import of Biomedical Patent, and finding “unfairness” and “inconsistency” where neither
exists.83 In Biomedical Patent, the Federal Circuit explained “that a State’s
waiver of immunity generally does not extend to a separate or re-filed suit.”84
Although the Federal Circuit did not delineate the extent to which waiver in
one proceeding might extend to another and left open the possibility that
waiver might carry over to another action,85 the court’s analysis suggests that
this would be a rare case.86
In Biomedical Patent, a company holding a patent covering a method of
prenatal screening for fetal chromosomal abnormalities, Biomedical Patent
Management Corporation (BPMC), sued the California Department of Health
Services (CDHS) for patent infringement.87 The suit involved the same parties, the same subject matter, and the same claims as an earlier dispute.88 In
the first suit, a private subcontractor of CDHS sought a declaratory judgment
that laboratory services performed by CDHS did not infringe on BPMC’s patent.89 Seeking a declaration of non-infringement and invalidity as well,
CDHS intervened, thereby waiving its sovereign immunity.90 BPMC then asserted a compulsory counterclaim of infringement against CDHS.91 The suit
was eventually dismissed without prejudice for improper venue.92 Several
years later, BPMC filed suit against CDHS asserting infringement of the same
patent.93 Even though the second suit involved “the same four counts” as
those contained in BPMC’s counterclaim in the first suit,94 the district court
and the Federal Circuit concluded that CDHS’s waiver of immunity in the first
83. See id. at *4 (“[A]llowing Patent Owner to assert its Eleventh Amendment immunity in
this proceeding selectively so as to bar Petitioner from obtaining the benefits of an inter partes review
of the asserted patent would result in substantial unfairness and inconsistency.”).
84. Biomedical Patent, 505 F.3d at 1339.
85. Other courts have also declined to “determine precisely the extent to which waiver in a
prior case might extend to a future one.” Wagoner Cty. Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. Grand River Dam
Auth., 577 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2009).
86. See infra notes 87–96 and accompanying text.
87. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal., Dep’t of Health Servs., No. C 06-00737 MHP,
2006 WL 1530177, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006).
88. Id. at *2.
89. Biomedical Patent, 505 F.3d at 1331.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1332.
94. Id. at 1331.
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action did not extend to the second suit.95 Given the almost identical posture
of the two actions,96 Biomedical Patent suggests that a waiver of immunity in
one proceeding will only extend to another in rare instances.
A matter like Ericsson, however, does not appear to constitute the rare
case justifying a departure from the general principle that a state’s waiver of
immunity in one action does not extend to a separate action. At the outset,
one would be hard-pressed to argue that inter partes review of a patent’s validity is not a separate action from a district court’s consideration of an infringement claim.97 As the Supreme Court has recognized, inter partes review
and district court litigation “provide[] different tracks—one in the Patent Office and one in the courts—for the review and adjudication of patent claims.”98
The fact that a stay of infringement litigation is not automatic and that a party
must move for a stay in the district court also demonstrates that inter partes
review is a distinct proceeding.99 Additionally, unlike Biomedical Patent,
which involved “the same four counts” and the same issues as in the previous
proceeding,100 the issue of infringement in district court litigation is “separate
and distinct” from the issue of patent validity in inter partes review.101 Furthermore, in contrast to Biomedical Patent, which involved claims asserted in
95. Id. (“Because we agree that [CDHS’s] initial waiver of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity does not extend to this case or judicially estop [CDHS] from asserting immunity in this case,
we affirm.”).
96. See Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 743 F. Supp. 2d 429, 436
(D.N.J. 2010) (describing “[t]he first and second suits in Biomedical [Patent]” as “practically identical”).
97. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (noting “that the
purpose of [inter partes review] is not quite the same as the purpose of district court litigation”).
98. Id. at 2146.
99. Although the AIA contains an automatic stay provision, it is very limited. Only a declaratory judgment action challenging a patent’s validity can be automatically stayed and, even then, only
if the action was brought “on or after the date on which the petitioner files a petition for inter partes
review of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2) (2012). In addition, a stay will not be automatic if “after
the date on which the petitioner files a petition for inter partes review of the patent,” the “patent owner
files a civil action or counterclaim alleging that the petitioner or real party in interest has infringed the
patent[.]” 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2)(B).
100. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal., Dep’t of Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
101. See Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“[T]his court has long recognized that patent infringement and invalidity are separate and distinct
issues. ‘Though an invalid claim cannot give rise to liability for infringement, whether it is infringed
is an entirely separate question capable of determination without regard to its validity.’” (quoting
Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
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the same type of forum—an Article III court—inter partes review of a patent’s
validity takes place in an administrative setting.102 Thus, measured against
Biomedical Patent, where the two proceedings were “practically identical”
and the court refused to find a waiver extension,103 it is dubious whether a
waiver of immunity in district court litigation is sufficient to effect a waiver
in inter partes review. Indeed, the PTAB in Ericsson seemingly recognized
the distinction between district court litigation and inter partes review when
it observed that “the proceedings are not the same.”104
To overcome the general presumption against waiver in separate proceedings, the PTAB pointed to the purported need to avoid “unfairness” and relied
on the precept “that a state should not reap litigation advantages through its
selection of a forum and subsequent assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense.”105 The PTAB explained that unfairness would inhere if the University
could avail itself of sovereign immunity in inter partes review after filing an
infringement lawsuit because “a party served with a patent infringement complaint in federal court must request an inter partes review of the asserted patent within one year of service of that complaint” under the AIA.106 In other
words, the University’s litigation conduct would lead to Ericsson being
“barred from requesting an inter partes review of the asserted patent[s].”107
But it is not clear how the University’s filing a patent infringement suit in
a federal district court leads to an unfair “litigation advantage.”108 Again,
there are two “different tracks—one in the Patent Office and one in the
courts—for the review and adjudication of patent claims.”109 “[B]oth are
102. See Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL
6517563, at *2 n.3 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (“[Inter partes] review is less like a judicial proceeding
and more like a specialized agency proceeding.” (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143)).
103. See Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 743 F. Supp. 2d 429, 436
(D.N.J. 2010).
104. Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4. In its recent decision in Oil States, the Supreme Court
also highlighted differences between inter partes review and district court litigation. See Oil States
Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018) (“Although inter
partes review includes some of the features of adversarial litigation, it does not make any binding
determination regarding ‘the liability [between the parties].’” (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 51 (1932))).
105. Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3–4 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Phoenix Int’l Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 466 (7th Cir. 2011)).
106. Id. at *3.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016).

15

[Vol. 2018, 1]

Ericsson and the Waiver by Litigation Conduct Doctrine
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

adequate fora to adjudicate . . . patent invalidity.”110 The University’s infringement suit would only cut off one of the two avenues available to Ericsson to assert patent invalidity. Although Ericsson would be precluded from
instituting inter partes review, the company would still be able to assert an
affirmative defense of patent invalidity in the infringement litigation.111 Thus,
the University’s patent infringement suit “bar[ring Ericsson] from requesting
inter partes review”112 would not completely foreclose “the review and adjudication”113 of Ericsson’s invalidity arguments.
The consequences of the University’s conduct in Ericsson stand in stark
contrast to the effects of governmental entities’ conduct in cases where the
Federal Circuit has expressed concerns regarding unfair litigation advantages.
For example, in Regents of the University of New Mexico v. Knight, which the
PTAB in Ericsson heavily relied upon, a state university filed suit in federal
court to enforce a patent claim and then asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity when the opposing parties filed compulsory counterclaims.114 Noting
the “seriously unfair results” that would arise if the state university could
block compulsory counterclaims, the Federal Circuit held that “when a state
files suit in federal court to enforce its claims to certain patents, the state shall
be considered to have consented to have litigated in the same forum all compulsory counterclaims.”115 Unlike in Knight, where the state university sought
to prevent a litigant from asserting a claim “in the same forum” in which the
sovereign voluntarily filed suit,116 the University’s invocation of immunity
would only prevent Ericsson from asserting patent invalidity before the PTAB
and would not bar the company from having its invalidity contention considered in the district court—the same forum in which the University initiated
the dispute. Accordingly, the consequences of the University’s actions in Ericsson do not rise to the level of the “seriously unfair results” flowing from

110. Dodocase VR, Inc. v. MerchSource, LLC, No. 17-CV-07088-EDL, 2018 WL 1475289, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018); see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: A
Series of Articles Examining Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 19
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 124, 131 (2018) (criticizing the PTAB’s judgment in Ericsson and stating
“the federal district court offers a federal forum in which both sides compete on rough parity”).
111. See Ford, supra note 21, at 78–81 (discussing affirmative defense of patent invalidity).
112. Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3.
113. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2146.
114. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
115. Id. at 1125–26 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
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the state university’s conduct in Knight.117
Even if the University were to obtain a litigation advantage by foreclosing
inter partes review, the waiver by litigation conduct doctrine “does not prevent a [state] from obtaining any sort of advantage relating to immunity in
pursuing [its] case.”118 Instead, the doctrine “only condemn[s] those litigation
advantages that are ‘inconsistent’ or ‘unfair.’”119 Because the University’s
conduct only removes one of the two tracks for reviewing a patent claim and
Ericsson’s invalidity arguments may be considered in another forum—the
same forum in which the University brought its patent infringement suit—any
litigation advantage achieved by the University would not be unfair.120 When
one considers that “the advantages of inter partes review (such as a more favorable claim construction standard and a lower burden of proof)” favor Ericsson, it becomes even more clear that the University’s conduct would not
lead to an unfair litigation advantage.121 The loss of Ericsson’s ability to seek
inter partes review where it is advantaged by the proceeding’s legal standards
is not a sufficiently compelling basis to find that the University’s assertion of
Eleventh Amendment immunity “would result in substantial unfairness.”122
Thus, by giving short shrift to Biomedical Patent and determining that the
University’s litigation conduct “would result in substantial unfairness,”123 the
PTAB’s waiver analysis is susceptible to criticism.

117. See id. at 1125.
118. Taylor v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 440 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005).
119. Id. (quoting Lapides v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002));
see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685 (1999) (“In
the sovereign-immunity context . . . ‘[e]venhandness’ between individuals and States is not to be expected.” (alteration in original)).
120. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 n.6 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“A patent challenger does not have nearly as much to lose from an erroneous denial of inter
partes review as a patent owner stands to lose from an erroneous grant of inter partes review. . . . [A
patent challenger] remains free to challenge the patent’s validity in [district court] litigation.”).
121. Id. These legal standards play a role in the PTAB’s high cancellation rate of patent claims
and “help[] explain the popularity of PTAB proceedings with many patent challengers.” Golden, supra note 25, at 1669. Although the PTAB’s rates of claim cancellation are not as high as they once
were, inter partes review proceedings remain a challenger-friendly forum for patent validity disputes.
See id.
122. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563,
at *4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
123. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It has been said that waivers of state sovereign immunity “provide a window into the ideology” of the Eleventh Amendment124—“one of the Constitution’s most baffling provisions.”125 The PTAB’s analysis of the waiver by
litigation conduct doctrine in Ericsson is particularly interesting because it
involves the application of this enigmatic doctrine in the context of the federal
patent system and the modern administrative state.126 Nonetheless, it is unclear whether Ericsson will help shape the boundaries of this indeterminate
doctrine.127 The ruling is certainly subject to opprobrium for its application
of the waiver doctrine, and the PTAB may have been motivated by a desire to
resist limitations on its power to review patent claims.128 What is clear, however, is that Ericsson will not be the last word on the waiver by litigation conduct doctrine.129

124. Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh
Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1170 (2003).
125. William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1983).
126. See supra Part IV.
127. See supra Part V; see also Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR201601127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3 n.4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (considering the PTAB’s analysis and
decision in Ericsson but finding the issue in Mylan to be distinguishable); cf. Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 2018-1638, 2018 WL 3484448 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2018) (declining
to adjudge the issue of whether state sovereign immunity can be successfully invoked in inter partes
review).
128. See Epstein, supra note 110 (“Any case in which a tribunal such as the PTAB decides a
case in favor of its own jurisdiction should be looked upon with deep suspicion, especially when the
tribunal has never ruled in ways that have limited its power.”).
129. See Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL
6611494, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2017) (noting the University’s intention to appeal the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit); see also Siegel, supra note 124, at 1169–70 (explaining why “[c]ases
concerning waivers are cropping up all over the federal courts”).
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